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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tiffany Leigh Turbyfill appeals following her conviction for felony DUI. On 
appeal, Ms. Turbyfill asserts that the district court erred when it denied her motion to 
dismiss the DUI charge pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8004(2) because one of her 
breath tests resulted in a reading of .054, below the legal limit of .08. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Tiffany Leigh Turbyfill was charged with driving while under the influence of 
intoxicants (hereinafter, DUI) for driving a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 
.08 or more. The charge was elevated to a felony because it was alleged that 
Ms. Turbyfill had been convicted of DUI twice in the ten years preceding the current 
charge. (R., pp.65-66.) Ms. Turbyfill was charged with felony DUI despite the fact that 
the first of the three breath tests to which she submitted showed an alcohol 
concentration of .054. 1 (R., p.20.) 
Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that because the result of 
one of the breath tests was below .08, Ms. Turbyfill could not be prosecuted for DUI 
under Idaho Code § 18-8004(2). (R., p.91.) A bifurcated hearing2 was held on the 
1 The results from the second and third tests were .108 and .110, respectively. 
(R., p.20.) 
2 The hearing was bifurcated because the State's expert witness was not available on 
the date set for the hearing. (TrVol./, p.?, L.23 - p.8, L.23.) As a result of the 
bifurcated nature of the hearing, two separate transcripts were prepared. A total of six 
separately-bound transcripts were prepared in this case, one, a hearing revoking bond, 
held on October 5, 2010, is not relevant on appeal. The remaining transcripts will be 
cited to as follows: the motion to dismiss hearing (day one) held on October 4,2010, will 
be cited to as "TrVol./"; the motion to dismiss hearing (day two) held on October 21, 
2010, will be cited to as "TrVol.""; the jury trial held on November 8, 2010, will be cited 
to as "TrVol. III"; the sentencing hearing held on January 18, 2011, will be cited to as 
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motion. At the hearing, defense counsel called Deputy Tim Reynolds of the Bonner 
County Sheriff's Department, who conducted the traffic stop and administered the three 
breath tests. Deputy Reynolds testified that the breath testing device he used was an 
Alco-Sensor III, an instrument certified for use in Idaho, that he has received special 
training in using it, and is certified by the State to operate it. He further testified that he 
followed all required procedures before obtaining the first breath sample of .054, the 
instrument was not malfunctioning, and that the instrument accurately measured the 
first breath sample that was provided by Ms. Turbyfill. (TrVol./, p.10, L.15 - p.17, L.21.) 
Deputy Reynolds further testified that because the second breath test, which 
measured .108, was not within .02 of the first breath test, procedurally, he was required 
to administer a third breath test. He also testified that those same procedures provide 
that "[i]f a subject fails or refuses to provide a second or a third sample, as requested by 
the operator, the results obtained [from the first] are still considered valid by the ISPFS, 
provided the failure to supply the requested samples was the fault of the subject and not 
the operator." (TrVol./, p.18, L.3 - p.19, L.10.) 
The State called Jeremy Johnston, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Laboratory in Coeur d' Alene, to testify about breath testing. 
Mr. Johnston testified that, as part of their training, police officers in Idaho are 
"instructed to try to acquire a deep lung air sample." The reason that officers are so 
instructed is that a sample of deep lung air provides a higher alcohol concentration than 
one of "shallow lung air." He further testified that the laboratory definition of a valid test 
"is two samples that are within [.]02 of each other. In the absence of that, [there must 
"TrVoI./V"; and the transcript of voir dire, opening statements, the jury instructions 
conference, and closing arguments will be cited to as "TrVoI.V." 
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be] a third sample to validate which of the first two samples is valid." (TrVoI.II, p.5, L.9 
- p.10, L.24.) 
Mr. Johnston then testified that there were a number of possible reasons why two 
breath samples would not be within .02 of each other. One possibility occurs H[i]f the 
officer is I guess a little quick on the trigger and presses the button too early and the 
person is providing either just mouth air or shallow lung air" which will result in "an under 
representation of what the person's true alcohol content - breath alcohol content would 
have been." (TrVoI.II, p.11, L.15 - p.12, L.19.) Mr. Johnston was asked by both the 
State and defense counsel whether the first test result was "invalid" and he consistently 
referred to it as an "aberration" but never as "invalid." (TrVoI.II, p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.7, 
p.16, Ls.15-23.) Additionally, Mr. Johnston testified, on cross-examination, that a 
shallow breath test does not "automatically" invalidate a breath test result. He further 
testified that, if a single test is performed because a driver refuses to provide a second 
sample, that single test result "could be considered valid for prosecution under the per 
se limit" and that, in those circumstances, he would testify that such a test result was 
valid. (TrVol./I, p.17, L.6, Ls.1-23.) 
Ultimately, after hearing argument from the parties, the district court "decline[d] to 
dismiss," finding that the issue presented by the motion was "one of fact," which would 
require a jury determination at trial. (Tr.Vol./I, p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.2.) The case then 
proceeded to a jury trial, at which Ms. Turbyfill was found guilty on the charge of DUI. 
(TrVoI.III, p.89, L.20 - p.90, L.3.) She then waived her right to a jury finding on the 
issue of her prior convictions, and admitted that she had twice been convicted of DUI or 
its statutory counterpart in the preceding ten years. (TrVol./ll, p.93, L.20 - p.94, L.15.) 
3 
Ms. Turbyfill received a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, 
which was suspended in favor of a five year term of probation. (TrVoI.IV, p.5, Ls.8-15.) 
She filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.173.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Turbyfill's motion to dismiss because one of 
her breath tests resulted in an alcohol concentration of .054, below the legal limit of .08? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Turbyfill's Motion To Dismiss Because One 
Of Her Breath Tests Resulted In An Alcohol Concentration Of .054, Below The Legal 
Limit Of .08 
A. Introduction 
In light of the statutory prohibition on prosecuting a person who provides a breath 
test result of less than .08 contained in I.C. § 18-8004(2), as interpreted in State v. Mills, 
128 Idaho 426 (Ct. App. 1996), and the fact that Ms. Turbyfill provided one test result 
that was .054, below the legal limit of .08, the district court was required to dismiss the 
DUI charge against her, and erred when it concluded that the issue presented was one 
of fact, requiring a jury determination. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Turbyfill's Motion To Dismiss 
Because One Of Her Breath Tests Resulted In An Alcohol Concentration Of .054, 
Below The Legal Limit Of .08 
Idaho Code § 18-8004(2) provides: 
Any person having an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08, as defined 
in subsection (4) of this section, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, 
or breath, by a test requested by a police officer shall not be prosecuted 
for driving under the influence of alcohol, except as provided in subsection 
(3), subsection (1)(b) or subsection (1)(d) of this section. Any person who 
does not take a test to determine alcohol concentration or whose test 
result is determined by the court to be unreliable or inadmissible against 
him, may be prosecuted for driving or being in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other 
intoxicating substances, on other competent evidence. 
I.C. § 18-8004(2). 
None of the exceptions contained in I.C. § 18-8004(2) apply to Ms. Turbyfill's 
case. Subsection (3) criminalizes driving while under the influence of a combination of 
alcohol and any drug; subsection (1)(b) applies to persons operating commercial motor 
vehicles; and subsection (1 )(d) applies to persons under twenty-one years of age. 
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I.C. § 18-8004. The final sentence of subsection (2) applies to prosecutions that do not 
involve per se intoxication.3 
In State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426 (Ct. App. 1996), the Court of Appeals considered 
I.C. § 18-8004(2) as applied to a DUI prosecution in which one of two test samples 
provided was below .10.4 Mills provided two breath samples, as required under 
regulations developed by the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement (hereinafter, 
IDLE). The first showed an alcohol concentration of .10, while the second measured 
.09. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, "arguing that the result of his breath test 
showed a BAC level of less than .10, and contended that I.C. § 18-8004(2) precluded 
the state from prosecuting him for DUI." After his motion was denied and he was 
convicted in the magistrate division, Mills appealed to the district court, which reversed, 
"holding that if either sample taken for the breath test fell below 0.10, the person tested 
could not be prosecuted." The State appealed from the district court's order. Id. at 427. 
The Court of Appeals described the issue before it as "whether, when two breath 
samples are administered as a 'test' under the IDLE, both samples must present a BAC 
level of less than .10 before the accused will be immune from prosecution pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-8004(2)." Id. at 428-29. The Court began its analysis by noting that the rule of 
lenity, requiring that criminal statutes be strictly construed in favor of the accused, also 
applies "to rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies." Id. at 429 
(citing State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380 (1993), Rhodes v. Industrial Comm'n, 125 
3 At trial, the State acknowledged that this exception did not apply to Ms. Turbyfill's 
case. (Tr.vol./Il, p.77, L.12 - p.78, L.4.) 
4 At the time that Mills was decided, the statute provided that a person committed DUI if 
the person drove with an alcohol concentration of .10 or greater. Although the statute 
has been amended to prohibit driving with an alcohol concentration of .08 or greater, the 
reasoning of the Mills opinion still applies, as the only change made to subsection (2) 
was replacing .10 with .08. Id. at 427-28. 
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Idaho 139, 142 (1993), and Bingham Memorial Hospital v. Dept. of Health and Welfare, 
112 Idaho 1094, 1096 (1987).) 
The Court concluded that the district court properly ordered dismissal of the DUI 
charge, explaining, 
Idaho Code § 18-8004(2) plainly speaks of "a test," which the IDLE in turn 
defines as consisting of at least two separate breath samples. We find 
this IDLE requirement of two samples to be inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute. We hold that one sample constitutes "a test," as 
that term is used in I.C. § 18-8004(2}, and if that sample shows a BAC 
level below 0.10, the accused cannot be prosecuted for OUI under this 
statute. Furthermore, if more than one sample is taken, each valid sample 
constitutes a test. If any of those samples falls below O. 10 then, again, the 
accused cannot be prosecuted for OUI under I.C. § 18-8004. We do not 
here question the authority of the IDLE to adopt standards requiring that 
more than one sample be taken when breath testing is performed. As 
stated in the policy statement attached as Appendix B to the state's brief, 
such a practice helps rule out "the possibility of an instrument malfunction, 
radio frequency interference, mouth alcohol or other rapidly fluctuating 
source of error which might effect a single result." However, taking two 
samples for quality control purposes does not permit the state to disregard 
one valid sample that shows an alcohol concentration of less than 0.10. 
Consequently, because one of Mills's breath samples fell below 0.10, and 
the state made no showing that the sample was an invalid aberration, Mills 
cannot be prosecuted for OUI. 
Id. at 429 (emphases added). 
In opposing Ms. Turbyfill's motion to dismiss, the primary argument advanced by 
the State below was that the first breath test result was an invalid aberration, and that, 
as a result, Mills was inapplicable to Ms. Turbyfill's case. (TrVoI.II, p.26, L.2 - p.28, 
L.8.) The State further argued that Mills could be distinguished by the fact that the two 
test results obtained were within .02 of each other, rendering each result, in the opinion 
of the State "valid." (Tr.VoI.II, p.25, L.11 - p.26, L.8.) 
In response, defense counsel, citing State v. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868 (Ct. App. 
1999), argued that a deficient sample is not inadmissible or unreliable so long as the 
proper procedures were followed in obtaining it. (TrVoI.II, p.23, Ls.13-19.) 
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Ultimately, the district court "decline[d] to dismiss," finding that the issue 
presented by the motion was "one of fact," which was something for the jury to decide. 
(Tr.vol./I, p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.2.) 
Ms. Turbyfill asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that the issue 
presented by her motion to dismiss was a factual one, requiring a jury determination. 
Mills is clear in its holding that "a test," under I.C. § 18-8004(2), is the result of one 
breath sample. The Mills court was clear in its direction that if one sample falls below 
the per se limit, the person cannot be prosecuted for DUI under a per se theory. 
The State's attempts to distinguish Mills are unavailing. Nothing in the Mills 
opinion indicates that one of the tests (if more than one is conducted) must be within .02 
of each other. In fact, the opinion clearly states that "one sample constitutes 'a test''' 
and further explains "if more than one sample is taken, each valid sample constitutes a 
test." Id. at 429 (emphasis added). The Court explicitly rejected the State's argument 
that the IDLE's definition of a test, requiring at least two separate breath samples, was 
applicable to the statute, and said nothing of the IDLE's requirement that the tests be 
within .02 of each other. 
Additionally, since the Mills decision, the Court of Appeals has determined that 
the type of test performed here, in which one sample was the result of shallow 
breathing, is a valid test under the statute. In State v. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868 
(Ct. App. 1999), the Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether a deficient sample 
provided during a breath test was admissible over a lack of foundation objection. The 
State called an expert witness from the IDLE, who testified "that a deficient sample is 
not an invalid sample, but merely one in which the subject did not breathe for a long 
enough period of time to reach sufficient deep lung air to give the most accurate reading 
9 
obtainable." The expert "affirmed that the Intoxilyzer 5000 measured accurately the 
sample presented, even though it is not a deep lung air sample," and "opined there was 
no possibility that the samples could have been less than .14 and .11 or that the volume 
of air presented to the Intoxilyzer affected the accuracy of the result." Mazzuca, 132 
Idaho at 870. 
In rejecting the defendant's claim that a deficient sample was not reliable and 
could not be admitted, the Court of Appeals, relying on case law from other states and 
the testimony of the State's expert, reasoned that "[t]he samples were deficient because 
Mazzuca failed to complete the tests as requested" and concluded that his case was 
"indistinguishable" from case law from other jurisdictions "where the courts held that the 
state laid sufficient foundation when it established that the test was properly 
administered, even though the results indicated that the breath samples were 
'deficient.'" Id. at 871. 
Below, and despite the clear holding of Mazzuca, the State argued that 
Ms. Turbyfill's low breath test reading, possibly resulting from the use of shallow lung 
air, was an invalid aberration. Ms. Turbyfill submits that the State cannot have it both 
ways. It cannot argue in one case, Mazzuca, that a deficient sample resulting from 
shallow lung air is valid and reliable when it benefits its case (because the deficient 
samples show per se intoxication),5 and later argue that a deficient sample resulting 
from shallow lung air is unreliable and invalid when it prevents it from prosecuting a 
case. It is important to note that the State's own expert was careful in testifying that the 
first test result was, in his opinion, an "aberration" but not necessarily invalid, and 
5 Interestingly, the test results sought to be introduced by the State in Mazzuca were not 
within .02 of each other, yet the State's expert testified that each test was valid and 
. accurate. 
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concluded it was an "aberration" only because it did not meet the same IDLE definition 
of "a test" rejected in Mills. (TrVol. II , p.5, L.9 - p.10, L.24.) 
The Court of Appeals' decisions in Mills and Mazzuca required dismissal in this 
case, and, as such, the district court erred when it concluded that the issue presented 
was purely factual, when it should have issued an order dismissing the charge and 
prohibiting a pro se prosecution of Ms. Turbyfill for DUI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Turbyfill respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction for felony DUI and remand this matter to the district 
court for entry of an order of dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(2). 
DATED this 19th day of April, 2012. 
SPENCEf{>J. HAHN L/ 
DeputY,-$late Appellate Public Defender 
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